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I. INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this Colloquium in Perugia brings to mind the early 
twentieth-century debate over the existence of a Latin American international 
law. It recalls, in particular, the work of Alejandro Alvarez, the Chilean jurist 
and judge on the International Court of Justice. Throughout his life, Alvarez 
strove to demonstrate the existence of a regional, American international law. 
While it included the United States, its principal sources were Latin American 
treaties, conferences, diplomatic history, and the actual practices of states. 
Alvarez had many opponents quick to underscore the paradox of a 
purportedly particular, yet equally universal, international law. In the end, the 
notion of a separate American international law was not widely accepted as 
accurate description or worthy aspiration.  
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Still, for our purposes here, examining Alvarez’s work more closely 
reveals the purposefully constructed nature of his American law. The legal 
materials that he marshaled to compose this corpus were: the practices of 
Latin American states, the principles commonly defended against European 
interference, and a series of treaties and treaty attempts aiming to consolidate 
these various norms.  For the most part, these consisted of nothing other than 
heightened versions of general principles of international law and customary 
practices not uncommon among lesser European powers, although not 
uniformly recognized as international law. The content of American 
international law was, in fact, not very exotic. It was just another variety of 
prescriptive understandings arranged in a particular way. 
Instead of a claim of real uniqueness or originality in law, this tradition-
building attempt is better understood in relation to its geo-politics. Alvarez’s 
project was a product of its time. It was a moment in which Latin American 
states were relatively subordinate in the international arena, not consistently 
invited to international congresses, infrequent participants in the creation of 
international law, and subject to periods of European and U.S. intervention in 
the region. At the time that Alvarez launched his concept, the U.S. occupied 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, had engineered Panama’s independence from 
Colombia, and controlled the Dominican Republic.   
The argument for a regional international law interceded in this 
realpolitik. It advocated the notion of hemispheric relations ordered through 
law. It placed Latin American states as authors of these international norms, 
and it included the United States within its realm.  Alvarez’s jurisprudence can 
be seen as a strategic geopolitical move to improve the standing and stature of 
the Latin American states within the international community. The joint 
authorship of an American international law by both Latin American states 
and the United States was one dimension. Equally, his work targeted the 
United States and its hegemonic role within the hemisphere. Beyond simply 
listing a set of common norms, Alvarez urged pan-American collaboration in 
the enforcement of international law within the hemisphere, as opposed to 
lone U.S. unilateralism. It was a bid against gunboat diplomacy. Specifically, he 
advanced the participation of “better constituted” Latin American states in 
matters of enforcement. Chile, Argentina, and Brazil could all be reliable 
partners, in his view, in enforcing international law in the Americas, 
foreclosing European intervention.   
Somewhat analogously, the topic of this colloquium invites us to reflect 
on the construction of legal traditions. The backdrop here is certainly the 
notion of a European legal tradition in the context of the European Union. 
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My remarks here are rather by way of comparison with a different context of 
legal tradition-building. My focus is on the contemporary formation of a 
“Latin American law.” Interestingly, it updates the story of Alvarez and his 
attempts to build and convince others of the specificity of an American and 
Latin American law. As my account of Alvarez already notes, his was a 
historical project of empowerment within the realm of international relations. 
It also was an attempt to temper raw U.S. power and unilateral intervention in 
the region.  
The historiography of a Latin American legal tradition over the past fifty 
years, however, has taken a very different turn. Notably, the notions of “Latin 
America” and “Latin American Law” have once again been mobilized in the 
legal field. This time, it is not as a source of creativity, difference, and standing 
– as it was for Alvarez. Rather, it is the foil against which legal reforms and 
institutional replacements, are argued, should take place. Indeed, the Latin 
American tradition of law – under this newer construction -- is forcefully 
depicted as one of lawlessness, legal formalism, an unbridgeable gap between 
law and society, legal ineffectiveness, law’s inefficiency, and official 
corruption. The most damning evidence against it is economic under-
development and political instability. Thus, instead of a fertile source of 
experience and experimentation in social organization, the legal tradition 
described is one of failure. This pronouncement is underwritten in a variety of 
ways. Indeed, it turns out to be the operative conclusion of law-and-
development writing and much inter-disciplinary literature on law in the 
region.  
Accordingly, within the context of legal development assistance in the 
past half-century, a core understanding is that Latin America’s law, and by 
extension the legal tradition, is significantly responsible for the lack of 
progress. The stock of analyses, diagnoses, inter-disciplinary studies, 
comparative and historical work, commentaries and the like constitute the 
foundations of this “tradition” of law.  The latter’s main characteristic – 
within this literature -- is its consistent failure to deliver prosperity and 
democracy.  
As a problem of law, this characterization then paves the way for any 
number and type of development prescriptions. Whether overt or implicit, 
this underlying narrative in project proposals and country reports establishes 
the basis for law reform, institutional re-design, and legal policy change.  The 
features highlighted as constant failings characteristic of law in Latin America 
are, however, predominantly intrinsic contradictions and limitations of all 
modern systems of liberal law. Development reforms, by contrast, are 
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championed as the rule of law, best practices, rules with better legal origins, 
and the like.  Yet, they are simply different versions and combinations of 
modern legal forms advancing certain policies and priorities. As a result, many 
of the intractable legal failings diagnosed in Latin America and associated with 
pre-reform law can only but persist even after waves of development reform. 
The real change is in the different distributional consequences, legal policies, 
institutional priorities, assignments of official discretion, and the like 
introduced by the legal structures implemented as development reform. 
This Essay describes, in very abridged terms, the instrumental 
construction of this particular tradition or identity of law in Latin America. As 
a back formation of law and development, it provides the permanent 
backdrop and rationale for legal change. Furthermore, this Essay sounds a 
cautionary note on the obfuscating role that identity constructions may 
produce in contexts of legal and policy reform.  
II. LEGAL TRANSNATIONALISM 
The legal communities in Latin American states have, historically, 
constructed their national legal discourse in deeply transnational ways. Indeed, 
the common observation that Latin America is part of the civil law tradition, 
or a member of the Romano-Germanic legal family, is primarily an outward 
sign of the embeddedness of this transnationalism within the region’s national 
legal systems.  This paradigm of “European” transnationalism, specifically, 
can be analyzed in its different historical moments and from its different 
theoretical underpinnings (such as natural law, positivism and legal sociology). 
At its most basic, European transnationalism offers a basis for taking 
positions on questions of legal interpretation. It provides arguments and 
models for law reform and institutional change. And, it legitimates action and 
discretion by local legal officials. Law, viewed in this way, is not simply the 
winning side of local political struggle or conflicting beliefs. Rather, it can be 
portrayed as more broadly transnational – if not plausibly universal. 
Additionally, this European transnationalism in Latin America has not 
meant the complete exclusion of transnational engagement with U.S. legal 
culture. In the area of constitutional law, to take an example, U.S. legal 
sources -- if often through the intermediation of European authors -- have 
been particularly salient. European legal transnationalism as practiced in Latin 
America, however, is not the object of my remarks here, except to note its 
salience in the region and its predominantly continental European connection. 
The focus here, instead, is on an analogous -- yet different -- transnational 
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paradigm more recently prominent within the region: law and development 
or, as I refer to it here, “development” transnationalism. This second 
paradigm, as well, can be analyzed as a distinct phenomenon with its own 
periods and theoretical bases.   
III. DEVELOPMENT TRANSNATIONALISM    
The past fifty years have seen a significant rise in exchange between the 
United States and Latin American states in the legal sphere. Chiefly, this is due 
to the funding initiatives of the U.S. government, U.S.-based foundations and 
U.S.-influenced international organizations. These efforts have generally been 
grouped together and described as the law and development movement. The 
topic has been extensively written about. Commentators note its different 
phases, changing political orientation, and general theoretical presuppositions. 
For the most part, however, the phenomenon has been addressed primarily 
from the supply side of the equation. The focus has been on the types of 
projects funded, their political economy, and the objectives of funding 
organizations. Scholars have also expounded on the mostly tacit legal theories 
underlying these efforts: primarily an uncritical faith in the effectiveness of the 
U.S. legal system and its positive co-relation with economic growth. At the 
same time, others have noted the imperious and imperial nature of these 
assumptions and designs. Additionally, attention has been directed to the 
actual beneficiaries of these projects, both governments in power and specific 
individuals who may benefit from the resources and clout they offer.   
In terms of funded projects, three different periods are generally noted: 
the original 1960-70’s developmental state round, the 1990’s neo-liberal 
round, and the more recent social justice moment. I briefly describe the main 
two periods here and leave for another time fuller discussion of the more 
contemporary third period. In the 1960-70’s, the funding organizations were 
either the U.S. government or U.S. based foundations, specifically the United 
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) and the Ford 
Foundation. The objective in this first round was state-led growth, planning 
and control by regulatory agencies, government reallocation of resources, and 
the like. It was supported by Keynesian economics placing the state as the 
principal agent of development. The objective in the legal sphere was a 
pragmatic state regulatory law, capable of effectively implementing 
government planning and transcending vested private rights with the potential 
to impede government action. Outwardly, legal development assistance was 
introduced as part of state modernization. Early projects emphasized 
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improving legal education and consequently the legal culture. 
Developmentalists believed the right prescription was American-style legal 
realism and policy-oriented lawyering.  In fact, in the first period, the main 
focus was to transform Latin American law schools along U.S. lines.     
In the late 1980’s and 1990’s neo-liberal round, more international 
organizations became involved, many of them following the lead of U.S. or 
U.S. controlled entities. Among them were Inter-American Development 
Bank, World Bank, along with early donors like Ford Foundation and 
USAID. Additionally, European Union and European national agencies have 
also more recently participated in projects of this type, less in Latin America 
than in Africa and the Maghreb. This second period was dominated by neo-
classical economics with its focus on free markets, privatization and de-
regulation. Accordingly, the principal objectives for law were the protection of 
private property, enforcement of contracts, regulation of securities markets, 
and enforcement of criminal law. 
The first two periods of law and development funding had very different 
economic theories driving them. The third more contemporary moment, now 
described by scholars, arises from the backlash against orthodox neo-
liberalism. The response on the part of donors has been to incorporate more 
social justice and minority rights concerns within their project funding 
priorities. Whether or not this change is significant or alters any of the main 
underlying propositions of neo-liberal developmentalism remains to be seen. 
An alternative way of conceptualizing law and development, however, is 
as a separate paradigm of transnationalism. Structurally, the projects fit the 
logic of foreign assistance by developed to lesser developed countries: Donors 
sponsor legal change in countries lacking developed law.  More broadly, 
though, law and development provides an alternative logic for reasoning 
about the law. It can be usefully compared to the European legal 
transnationalism, strongly rooted in Latin America. It can propel very 
differently oriented projects on its account. It can draw on various legal 
theories for justification. It no doubt redounds to the benefit of governments 
and individuals capable of mobilizing its resources. And, it appeals to the 
promise of prosperity and democracy – economic and political development -
- through better versions of law or the “rule of law,” tout court. The many 
conflicting political aspirations of societal actors all appear equally attainable 
simply through the right mix of positive law, public institutions, and legal 
culture. In this way, development transnationalism offers a legal terrain in 
which to work out the problems of poor economies, human rights violations, 
deficient democracy, and the like.  
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Thus, as an epistemic construct, development transnationalism provides 
a rationale for a wide range of legal change at the level of positive law, legal 
institutions, legal culture, etc. It orients this activity under the rubric of 
promoting development, and it provides significant legitimacy by the weight 
of foreign and local experts, international organizations, and scholarly 
consensus. Additionally, in Latin America, transnationalism, as already noted, 
is an historically accepted and privileged driver of legal change. The deep-
seatedness of European transnationalism as a mode of legal reasoning and 
legitimation paves the way for yet different modes of transnationalism. 
IV. THE LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 
Salient within the paradigm of development transnationalism – in all its 
phases -- is the counterpoint image of the poor quality of legal systems in 
Latin America. Notably, though, in many Latin American countries, law and 
legal institutions are well developed elements of national social systems. 
Observers have noted that Latin American states are not lacking in law, in fact 
there may be too much of it. There are abundant law schools and law 
graduates. Political leaders and government officials often have legal training. 
Moreover, law and legal discourse from Europe and the United States have 
been primary tools of governance, over these countries’ nearly 200 years of 
independence.  
As such, law and development’s main tenet that law is central to 
prosperity and democracy would seem to call for a better explanation in Latin 
America. There the legal systems have ostensibly failed to deliver. 
Presumptively, a diagnosis pointing to the absence of Western conceptions of 
liberal law is not plausible. As noted above, Latin American societies are 
steeped in Western law, and legal institutions pervade much of society. Rather, 
the general diagnosis is directed at the kind of law and legal institutions in 
Latin America. 
This explanation, however, is assembled in some very peculiar ways. The 
general description, and the constructed tradition of Latin American law it 
supports, suffers from at least three different types of flaws. First, particular 
problems or issues in one location are generalized and projected onto Latin 
America as a whole. Conclusions are based less on detailed empirical and 
contextual analyses than on overall assertions about commonalities. Thus, for 
example, insufficient protection of defendant rights within the criminal 
procedure of countries such as Chile or Argentina is conflated with lax law 
enforcement in Colombia. In both situations, the adversarial system and oral 
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hearings have been promulgated as the proper solution, propelled by the 
purported, all-around superiority of development-supported “adversarialness.”  
Second, units of analysis stemming from particular political or cultural 
preferences in the U.S. or the North Atlantic are applied to the Latin 
American context indiscriminately. The inexistence of that same political or 
cultural combination in some place in Latin America is then used to show an 
institutional lack or failure. For example, constitutional change through 
judicial interpretation may be preferred to constitutional change through 
amendments or new constitutions. It is not clear though that one is necessarily 
preferable to the other. Indeed, diametrical judicial re-interpretations of 
constitutional law may shake public confidence in the rule of law, especially in 
populations not thoroughly imbued in liberal legal ideology. In Latin America, 
constitutional change through new texts has been characterized as evidence of 
constitutional failure. Another example, the lobbying of law-makers and 
regulators by regulated industries may be deemed perfectly legal in the U.S., 
but ex parte communications with judges may be seen as evidence of 
corruption. While in some cases the legality in the one and corruption in the 
other may be clear, the difference is not universally obvious. These are just a 
few very general and broad-stroke examples.  
The two types of flaws, described above, can be considered problems of 
insufficient context and narrow functionalism. There is another type of flaw 
that is more difficult to correct.  Internal critiques of liberal law, traceable to 
the legal history of the West, are passed off as deficiencies specific to Latin 
America. To offer just a couple of examples here, they consist of some of the 
following. 
First is law’s backwardness. This notion is expressed in different ways. It 
is often depicted as a legal culture stuck in an earlier time, reminiscent of the 
past in the West. The region’s law is seen as dominated by conceptual 
formalism. The image is not unlike classical legal thought or Lochnerism in 
the U.S.  Additionally, the theories of a handful of European jurists are 
believed to represent the whole of legal consciousness in the region. Notably, 
ideas commensurate to legal realism and pragmatic legal reasoning are 
believed to have not yet arrived.  
Second is the gap between law and society. The gap refers to the distance 
between the law practiced by ordinary people and the law on the books. This 
disjuncture is deemed inordinately, and measurably, wider in Latin America 
than elsewhere. It is one of the most salient images about law in the region. It 
is pervasive in development writing. And, it is supported by various, presentist 
works of legal history and social science. Notably, this notion is deployed by 
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many different camps. For example, it is celebrated by advocates of legal 
pluralism, possibly influenced by their interest in elevating the stature of 
particular group law relative to the law of the state. More traditional 
scholarship makes reference to this same idea in terms of the law’s lack of 
penetration in society. Some progressive scholars have described it in terms of 
the symbolic versus operative value of law: whereby socially responsive 
legislation and constitutions are denounced as only symbolic, and not actually 
effective.  
Third is a culturally inappropriate European law. This element of the 
diagnosis is not unrelated to the measure of the gap between law and society. 
It figures as one of the explanations for the distance between the two. 
Essentially, though, it is the flip side of Latin America’s historical European 
legal transnationalism. The latter serves a number of functions, as noted 
above, and can be seen as simply a different sort of trannational paradigm. 
Within the alternate development paradigm, it becomes one of the elements 
of the diagnosis of malfunction. Indeed, from this perspective, the deep 
engagement in European transnationalism is one of the sources of legal failure 
in the region.  
Fourth is elite control of the law. This observation may express a more 
radical point about liberal law in capitalist societies. It can mean that the rule 
of law simply masks the true sources of power in society. In its development 
version, it conjures the particular salience of a Latin American oligarchy in 
control of the state. It also functions as an indictment of the sector of society 
resistant, for one reason or another, to proposed legal changes. It is often 
denoted as lack of “political will” by the powers-that-be. This position 
conceives development reform as technical improvement, impeded by 
illegitimate self-interest, lethargy or ignorance. It ignores the political and 
distributional stakes inherent in existing law and in reforms.  It groups 
together those that may be politically or economically opposed with those 
simply standing to lose ill-gotten rents. However, not in all cases is resistance 
to a particular legal change exclusive to the elites, just like not all law reform 
benefits the poor. 
There are other elements of the development diagnosis, but these 
examples suffice for my purposes here. In short, statements of the above type 
are well-known critiques found in the history of jurisprudence in the United 
States and in Europe. In fact, each of these has counterparts in both 
traditions. In the development context, they are more often expressed in the 
U.S. vernacular. For example, the backwardness of law can be traced to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s observations about law in the U.S. in his article, The Path of 
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the Law. In it, Holmes expressed the need of every generation to update its law 
in its own language and in terms of its own uses. Scholars note Holmes’ role 
as a precursor to legal realism and a critic of formalism. Critiques of 
conceptual formalism in the U.S. were a mainstay of legal realists in the 
1920’s-30’s in the United States.  Realism sparked a loss of faith in logical 
abstraction at the level performed by the then reigning classical legal thought. 
Abstract principles were as a result no longer generally believed capable of 
rendering concrete particular results in specific cases.  As another example, 
the gap between the law on the books and law in action is commonly 
attributed to Roscoe Pound and his sociological jurisprudence. Here was yet 
another attempt to unseat the mechanical or formalist jurisprudence. Gap 
studies also became popular in the 1960’s by scholars of law and society. They 
were a welcome accompaniment to the bold constitutional changes of the 
Warren court. And so on with other elements of the diagnosis. 
As already noted, these critiques or positions within jurisprudence have 
their analogues in the civilian tradition. Indeed, it is an interesting question of 
intellectual history to note their often contemporaneous popularity on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Critics of formalism such as Rudolf von Jherring and 
François Gény, to cite a couple, can be seen to express similar ideas to legal 
realists and sociological jurisprudes in the U.S.  Other parallels include the 
French juristes inquiets critics of legal exegesis, the German Free Law 
movement, sociological functionalism, and critical social theory. Some of 
these jurisprudential commonalities have already been well described by 
comparative scholars: others remain to be more fully explored.  
Whether in U.S. legal jurisprudential terms or civilian ones, these 
positions are predominantly internal arguments within modern systems of law. 
Historically, they can be traced to particular political contexts with real stakes. 
Over time, they can also be seen to support particular positions in contests 
over legal interpretation and institutional design. In this way, they are part of 
the repertoire of legal political argument, often deployed in favor of one or 
another position on legal policy, positive law, legal institutions, constitutional 
interpretation, and change of this sort.  
Each of these may have been at one time potentially devastating attacks 
on the legitimacy of the existing legal system, but for the most part they are 
currently normalized features of liberal legal discourse. For example, the 
common observation of elite control of law parallels a Marxist-type analysis of 
the real power in society and law’s merely masking role. However, in the 
development diagnosis they serve merely as arguments for much tamer policy 
change and distributional reallocation. They usher in reforms consisting of 
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other versions of liberal law with different positive rules, institutional design, 
and historic or cultural origins. As such, the observed existence of the above-
described negative phenomena within the law is never fully rectified or 
eliminated.  
Indeed, aspects of law will always be liable to charges of needed updating 
– depending on what one wants to change. Conceptual formalism is an 
inherent dimension of logical reasoning: Its total elimination is impossible. 
What we find logically convincing may only be phenomenologically produced. 
In other words, there is no clear dividing line between formal and anti-formal, 
it may be a product of shared experience varying from reference group to 
reference group. The gap between law and action is axiomatically ever present. 
While surely there may be some rules more closely followed than others, a full 
society-wide measure is quite impossible. Resources for law enforcement 
surely play a predominant role. Plus, the reasons for rule non-compliance may 
be so broad ranging that even such a measure, were it possible, would be 
practically meaningless.  
In any case, these internal critiques comprise the diagnosis of law in 
Latin America. This repertoire of legal arguments is projected as the external 
description of Latin American legal systems as a whole.  As such, the charge 
of formalism is not simply directed at a line of conservative constitutional 
opinions but rather it becomes a problem of the whole legal culture. The law 
in action is not simply a way of privatizing areas of commercial law but rather 
marks the irrelevance of the whole of state law. European transnationalism is 
not simply a mode of legal reasoning but a mark of cultural inappositeness of 
the social system that is law and its exclusivity to a racial and cultural minority 
in the region. In short, the architects of development transnationalism have 
projected these moves as the diagnosis. This rendering promotes law reform 
and institutional re-design. Projects are, in this way, more easily sold. Absent a 
functioning law, replacement or substitution appears not only desirable but 
necessary.  
Over time, these particular explanations and diagnoses buttressing 
particular projects of law reform or funding assistance have consolidated a 
standing narrative about law in Latin America. The amalgamation of these 
mutually-reinforcing descriptions has the effect of casting law in the region as 
effectively incapable of performing the functions expected of law. These 
enduring views have ripened into an identity or, in effect, a tradition of law. 
This instrumentalized image has solidified into the common understanding of 
the workings of law in the region. However, the shortcomings identified and 
the failings decried paint a permanent picture of failure. As noted above, the 
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elements of this diagnosis cannot be reversed through simple law reform. 
They are constantly observable features of liberal legal systems. Moreover, 
these internal critiques passing as diagnosis – while no doubt insights of 
jurisprudence on the workings and assumptions of liberal legalism – are 
routine tactical moves within legal politics. They are available to advance 
endless proposals. Thus, as failings of the legal system to be rectified and 
fixed, success is never achievable. Their endogeneity to liberal law is what 
makes them continually available as justifications for new reforms.   
Troublingly, as a significant dynamic for law reform in Latin America, it 
seriously debilitates and undermines law, generally, as a social system. 
Pursuing reform in this way is counter-productive. First, it undermines the 
legal system purportedly “assisted” by continually denigrating it for the 
purpose of ushering in reforms. The reforms are equally liberal legal forms 
subject to the same failings previously diagnosed.  Second, it occludes 
potential alternatives and values in pre-reform law not openly evaluated. An 
example is the mix of defendants’ rights and state enforcement powers in the 
areas of criminal procedure. The detailed question of specific rights at 
different stages of the proceedings and the appropriate mix in particular 
countries take a back seat to the juggernaut of transforming procedure from 
the traditional inquisitorial to the development adversarial. This example 
particularly shows the impact of the widely reviled “inquisitorial” model linked 
to Latin America, branded the cause of evils ranging from human rights 
abuses to non-enforcement, impunity, secrecy, corruption, undemocratic-ness 
and the like. However, the mere substitution of inquisitorial to adversarial 
obscures the many detailed policy questions that re-calibrating criminal 
procedure entails. More “orality” and shifting discretion from the judge of 
instruction to the public prosecutor will not solve the intrinsic tensions 
between political independence and official accountability, defendant rights 
versus state enforcement powers, positive law and social behavior.   
In short, legal and institutional reform under the umbrella of 
development transnationalism undermines a significant amount of potential 
legal capital, or acquis légaux. Many legal policies and institutional forms may be 
easily if not automatically rejected through this formula. In this short Essay, it 
is not possible to discuss the array of legal capital existing within legal systems 
in Latin America. Briefly, though, they consist in part of the accumulated 
social investment in law and legal institutions over time, such as training the 
legal profession in certain modes of procedure and discourses of 
argumentation. A switch to different processes with different discursive 
landmarks and constraints adds significant costs. However, without a clear 
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definition of the policy changes and distributional consequences sought, a 
different legal institutional model may not fare any better. Indeed, as a result 
of the limitations of liberal law noted above, the same failure will likely re-
appear.  
Additionally, the acquis légaux also include particular political positions or 
policy combinations enshrined in law that, as a result of the development 
formula for reform, are never openly considered as real alternatives. It may be 
that a current policy mix can be convincingly shown to be counter-productive 
to economic development, but then again the reform may simply be more 
beneficial to those effectively mobilizing a “development” argument. For 
example, the position to reduce pro-labor legislation in Latin American 
countries draws strongly on the characterization of general legal failure. 
Specifically cited are the lack of enforcement, limited coverage, and 
cooptation of unions by government in some cases. In other words, the 
diagnosis is the same: lawlessness, the gap between law on the books and law 
in action, and official corruption. Discrediting national law assists in making 
the case for reforms. More concretely, however, real questions of policy over 
job security, workers’ rights, medical benefits, and the like are at play. 
Moreover, such reforms begin to shape the national political economy. Much 
of this discussion and debate, however, is waged only indirectly. It is obscured 
by the logic of development transnationalism. Rather than confront the stakes 
more directly, attention is directed to rectify purportedly broken legal systems, 
when at issue are policy changes and distributional re-allocations. 
V. INTER-DISCIPLINARY SUPPORT FOR THE TRADITION 
The development diagnosis is also supported by inter-disciplinary work. 
The main examples come from legal history, comparative politics, and legal 
sociology.  In this section, though, I will draw from an example from finance 
studies. Briefly, the “legal origins” literature recently developed in the area of 
law and finance is another example of failed law discourse. The source is a 
series of empirical works by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. The authors claim a significant co-
relation in levels of national economic development, measured by breadth of 
share ownership and depth of capital markets, to the legal origins of key 
corporate law rules. To do this, they divide countries into categories based on 
the origin of four primary legal systems:  English, French, German and 
Scandinavian. They show through statistical regression that countries whose 
relevant business law originates in France fare far worse than any other group 
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of countries. The common law countries perform the best. The authors admit 
that France and Belgium, notwithstandingly, are developed countries. (You 
can’t argue with success.) Other than a few other also developed European 
countries -- like the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain --- most 
other French-origin countries are in fact Latin American states.  
I highlight this school of scholarship, and work of this type, to note the 
overall impact of studies like this. This type of literature contributes to the 
overall diagnosis of a failed law in Latin America. It is not dependent on 
development expert reports for its conclusions. Rather, the common sense 
understanding of experts, law firms, government agencies, and professors of 
law are formed and buttressed by social science and other academic work of 
this nature. This type of study, however, is highly questionable. Numerous 
critiques of the “legal origins” theses are already published. To note a few, 
Detlev Vagts notes that legal comparativists have long shown these groupings 
of legal families do not withstand scrutiny. Mathias Siems argues that “legal 
families” culled from generic comparative law texts is too imprecise a variable 
for econometric measures. Moreover, Siems notes: “the fact that in most law 
and finance studies the French legal family performs worst is mainly a 
statement about Latin America.” Mark Roe shows that differences of political 
economy, including devastation by war and government policy, are better 
explanations of differential economic performance. Mark West notes the 
possibility of statistically significant regressions of legal origins with something 
as outlandish as world cup victories – in which case French legal origin is 
fantastic.  West provocatively makes the point that a-contextual regression 
analyses can lead to quite non-sensical results.  Daniel Berkowitz, Katherina 
Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, in a rather more internal critique, note the 
significant difference in home-grown origins versus transplanted-law origins. 
In short, despite its serious flaws, scholarship of this type contributes to 
the construction of Latin America’s tradition of law. This scholarship can be 
particularly easily instrumentalized in the service of development 
transnationalism. It supports the general diagnosis of law in the region. In this 
way, it can bolster country reports and project proposals in individual areas. It 
is not that I am claiming a conspiracy of the social sciences in reaching 
conclusions concordant with the overall paradigm of international relations in 
the legal sphere. However, scholars may be drawn to these research designs 
and feel comfortable with their overall conclusions because they appear to be 
common sense.  Clearly, there have been greater levels of economic 
development in the United States than in Latin America. Statistically co-
relating legal system origins to that fact, however, tells us nothing about the 
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political and social context.   It does, however, solidify an image of law and 
legal families as a set of competing models. Within that competition, the Latin 
American version is again presented as failed.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The paradigm of development transnationalism in Latin America 
promotes the construction of a tradition of Latin American law. Rather than a 
positive source, this tradition is the characterization of pre-reform law against 
which development reforms are to be undertaken. Such tradition is produced 
by analyses and diagnoses of law’s failure to deliver development and 
democracy to the region. It is bolstered by works of legal history, comparative 
politics, and legal sociology drawn to this same problematic. Often reading the 
same diagnosis back into the history of Latin American states, or finding the 
same failings in every social sector of national societies, inter-disciplinary 
scholars frequently reinforce the same conclusions. Specifically, law in Latin 
America is faulted for the intrinsic limitations of liberal law as a system of 
social governance. In this way, the failure described is permanent. It is 
inherent in all modern legal systems to some degree.  
Viewed, then, as an instrumental characterization, the Latin American 
legal tradition of legal failure serves to promote projects of legal change and 
reform. While the projects advanced may have different political valences – 
including some with which we might agree – my argument here is that reform 
pursued in this way is counterproductive and undermines the standing of law 
in the region. Furthermore, it obfuscates the real questions underlying legal 
reform and the actual impact that these changes bring. Under cover of a 
substitution to a more developed law, the rule of law, best practices, or what 
have you, a different set of policies and institutional arrangements are put in 
place. While this has the effect of changing course, it is less clear that the 
policies previously in place have been convincingly shown wrong or lack 
majority support. Moreover, some political positions worth defending may be 
more easily swept away through the fiction of pursuing policy and 
distributional change as simply a matter of correcting for a failed law. 
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